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Why the British Government Must Invest in the Next Generation of Intelligence 
Analysts 
Joe Devanny, Robert Dover, Michael S Goodman and David Omand 
 
[abstract]In this article, Joe Devanny, Robert Dover, Michael S Goodman and David 
Omand explore the current problems facing intelligence analysis and analysts in the UK 
and consider what might be done to tackle them. They argue that nothing less than a 
revolution in the British Government’s approach to intelligence assessment is required 
and that this ought to take the form of a School of Intelligence Assessment within a 
properly financed and structured National Security Academy.[/abstract] 
 
The last decade has presented a formidable array of national security challenges: a global 
financial crisis; the 2011 Arab uprising and the ongoing conflict in Syria; Russian military 
attacks on Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), and almost certainly the Russian use of a 
chemical weapon in the UK (2018); the persistence of the international terrorist threat, in 
mutating forms; and the increasing salience of ‘cyber’ as a significant vector of threat to 
a wide variety of vulnerable targets.  
The UK has tried to respond to these evolving threats in a structured and strategic 
manner. Since the first publication of a formal national security strategy (NSS) in March 
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2008,1 the UK has seen three further iterations of the NSS in 2009,2 20103 and 20154 – the 
last two aligned or combined with strategic defence and security reviews (SDSR) – as 
well as reforms of national security coordination.5 The central argument that runs 
through each iteration of the NSS is simple but not straightforward and has far-reaching 
implications: does the government have the resources to make sense of the complex, 
dynamic and uncertain world we live in?      
This article goes beyond previous efforts to analyse the underlying investment in 
national security and its component parts (including defence, diplomacy, intelligence and 
security) to focus on the central role of intelligence assessment in national security 
decision-making – and argues for nothing less than a revolution in the British 
government’s approach to intelligence assessment. The authors consider it therefore 
both significant and encouraging that the post of Professional Head of Intelligence 
Assessment (PHIA) in the Cabinet Office has recently been recreated at 2* (Director) 
level as a focus for re-examining the nature and breadth of the profession of intelligence 
analysis and its training needs, and therefore could provide a focus for unifying standards 
for intelligence education.  
                                                 
1 HM Government, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World’ (Cm 7291), March 2008. 
2 HM Government, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009: Security for 
the Next Generation (Cm 7590), June 2009. 
3 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Cm 
7953), October 2010.  
4 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A 
Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom (Cm 9161), November 2015. 
5 Joe Devanny, ‘Co-ordinating UK Foreign and Security Policy: The National Security Council’, 
RUSI Journal (Vol. 160. No. 6, 2015), pp. 20–26. 
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This is a step in the right direction, but the government can go further, and faster. 
The British government must finally accept that there is a clear requirement for investing 
in and resourcing an intelligence assessment community that meets the needs of a 
‘Global Britain’, as described in the March 2018 National Security Capability Review 
(NSCR).6 This lengthy study reviews and endorses the priority to be given to countering 
the threats identified in the 2015 NSS/SDSR. Prominent among them are the combination 
of the resurgence of state-based threats and increasing competition between states; the 
undermining of the international rules-based order; and the rise in cyber attacks from 
both state and non-state actors.7 These challenges are predicted to continue to intensify 
and evolve. Their increasingly complex and intertwined nature is said now to require a 
more effective whole-of-government approach, underpinned by robust intelligence 
assessment, under the new national security ‘Fusion Doctrine’.8 
 The challenge in providing intelligence support, both strategic and tactical 
analysis and assessment, for such an agenda is only partially recognised in the NSCR. In 
the context of widespread government austerity, there is provision for growth in the 
Single Intelligence Account (SIA) budget of 18% in real terms.9 The 2015 NSS/SDSR also 
committed to the recruitment of more than 1,900 additional intelligence officers across 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service (MI5) and the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6) – together colloquially known as the UK 
Intelligence Community (UKIC).10 The National Crime Agency (NCA), an intelligence-led 
                                                 
6 HM Government, ‘National Security Capability Review’, March 2018, pp. 7–8. 
7 HM Government, ‘National Security Capability Review’, pp.5-6.  
8 HM Government, ‘National Security Capability Review’, pp. 10–11. 
9 HM Government, ‘National Security Capability Review’, p.9. 
10 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, 
November 2015, p.24. 
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law enforcement agency responsible for addressing the threat of serious and organised 
crime, is also on a recruitment drive for investigators and intelligence analysts.11  
However, it should be noted that while the UKIC budget has increased since 2010, 
investment in the intelligence assessment community had largely remained flat in real 
terms for much of the past decade, even as the number of intelligence requirements 
increased.12 There is some concern that the gap between intelligence collection and 
intelligence assessment has become a systemic risk, in the sense of the disconnect 
between a sustained investment in collection that has not been directly mirrored by a 
proportionate investment in the size, scope and capability of assessment.13 An example 
of the government’s own efforts to address this gap is its commitment to lift the Joint 
Intelligence Organisation’s (JIO) budget from around £3.5m in 2016 to £5.2m by 2020/21. 
The latest publicly available information indicates that 80% of the JIO’s staff are in 
operational roles as assessment officers, equating to around 60 officers, a cohort larger 
than the entire JIO staff in 2016.14 This number is, of course, still dwarfed by the more 
than 12,000 staff employed (as of 2016, the number has subsequently increased) in the 
UKIC – a significant percentage of whom focus directly on intelligence collection.15 
                                                 
11 The NCA is itself a product of this decade of national security reforms. It was announced in 2011 
(operational from 2013) as the successor to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which was 
conceived in 2005 and operational from 2006. 
12 Requirements are agreed annually in May or June by the National Security Council, as part of the 
Intelligence Coverage and Effects Plan, a cross-government process coordinated by the Cabinet 
Office National Security Secretariat between January and April each year. 
13 See, for example, Mark Townsend, ‘How a Crippling Shortage of Analysts Let the London Bridge 
Attackers Through,’ The Guardian, 11 June 2017. 
14 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 
Annual Report 2016-2017 (HC655), 20 December 2017, pp.102-3. 
15 SIA staff figures, at 31 March 2016, from the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual 
Report 2017-2017, comprising: 4,053 staff in the Security Service (p.72); 2,594 in the Secret Intelligence Service 
(p.77); and 5,806 in GCHQ (p.84). 
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International comparisons are also instructive: Australia, with an intelligence community 
roughly half the size of UKIC, employs around 138 officers in its JIO-equivalent body, the 
Office of National Assessments, with an independent review in 2017 describing even that 
figure as a ‘relatively small base’, recommending an increase of 50% to address the 
increasing number of requirements facing the Australian intelligence community.16 
Numbers only tell part of the story; capabilities matter too. The most recent 
annual report of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament quotes the then 
acting chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee conceding that, by the middle of this 
decade, the Assessment Staff had become under-funded, under-staffed relative to 
priorities, and was ‘no longer at the cutting edge of where we should be’.17 The UK 
needs, therefore, to think carefully about how its assessment capabilities can be 
improved. 
   The JIO is tasked with implementing recommendations to improve and 
standardise working practices across the assessment community, aiming to enable a 
more rigorous approach to producing assessments that inform national security policy 
and decision-making. And there are other specific intelligence challenges identified in the 
NSCR, including delivering the support to enable the planned Joint Force to be more 
versatile and agile; the integration of the knowledge and expertise held by all the border 
organisations to produce comprehensive strategic threat assessments for the border 
(important for the post-Brexit environment); a new intelligence framework for serious 
                                                 
16 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, June 2017, p. 68.  
17 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ISC Annual Report 2016-2017 (HC655), 
December, pp. 103–4.  
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and organised crime; and measures to improve disruption of terrorist plots in their early 
stages.18 
 Taken together, these add up to a major challenge for the development, training 
and education of the UK intelligence assessment community, not just in the JIO, Defence 
Intelligence (DI) and the national intelligence collection agencies, but also for the 
analysts involved in the many departments and agencies that are to be instrumental in 
implementing the Fusion Doctrine, and which may have only limited prior experience of 
working with government intelligence agencies. Those working as analysts in Britain’s 
intelligence community need to behave with the status of a profession, with a code of 
ethics and common legal standards, promoting best practice and ensuring that analysts 
can keep up to date with developments in the field and outside, not least in information 
sciences and artificial intelligence (AI). The formal creation of intelligence analysis as one 
of the 28 civil service professions is an important step, but this needs to be followed 
through with a sense of momentum and series of initiatives to foster a real sense of 
shared professional identity for intelligence analysts working across government. 
The authors consider that this will only be possible by giving this profession a 
physical embodiment through creating a School of Intelligence Assessment, building 
upon the still embryonic virtual National Security Academy (vNSA)19 and most probably 
located (institutionally if not physically) in the Cabinet Office. Such a school would deliver 
                                                 
18 UK Government, ‘National Security Capability Review’: Joint Force (pp.14-17); border 
organisations (pp.26-27); serious and organised crime (pp.23-25); and counter terrorism (pp.18-20). 
19 The 2015 NSS/SDSR announced (p.84): ‘We will establish a virtual National Security Academy which will act 
as a hub…to share, develop and maintain critical knowledge and skills across the national security community, 
leading to greater coherence and common professional standards.’ The 2018 NSCR subsequently described 
(p.49) the creation of the vNSA as an ‘[i]n progress or ongoing’ objective, describing its new ‘primary focus’ as 
the provision of training in the Fusion Doctrine (p.11). For further treatment of the vNSA in this article, see 
p.15 below. 
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training itself – not least a Junior, Intermediate and Senior Analyst Programme as the 
backbone of wider analytic education, including the creation and nurturing of career 
pathways. By providing a clear focal point for analytical training and education across the 
whole profession, the school could also usefully remove the barriers that currently exist 
to the effective mobilisation of those outside the intelligence community in academia 
and the private sector, enabling analysts from all agencies and departments to tap into 
their deep subject-matter, methodological and theoretical expertise as part of a 
coherent, shared curriculum.20 An example of the value of such collaboration is the work 
undertaken by one of this article’s authors to assist the NCA with its professionalisation 
and internationalisation agenda.21 The school would also be a natural focus for fruitful 
exchanges with international allies and partners, themselves facing the same need for 
transformation.22 
 
[h1]Development of the Profession of Analysis 
Historically, there was no need for a separate profession of intelligence analysts. Robert 
Cecil, the key policymaker for Queen Elizabeth I, was perfectly capable of assessing 
himself the secret intelligence brought to him by Walsingham’s spy network. During the 
19th and 20th centuries, however, the increasing scale and complexity of the intelligence 
challenge required a greater specialisation of analytical effort. 
                                                 
20 Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, ‘Impactful Scholarship in Intelligence: A Public Policy 
Challenge’, British Politics (Vol. 13, No. 3, 2018), pp. 374–91; see also Philip H J Davies, 
‘Assessment BASE: Simulating National Intelligence Assessment in a Graduate Course’, 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (Vol. 19, No. 4, 20016), pp. 721–36. 
21 University of Leicester, ‘Highest Recognition from the National Crime Agency for Intelligence 
Expert’, 1 August 2018. 
22 See the section ‘Developments Overseas’ below. 
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 The development of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) from its 
beginnings in 1936 required a new breed of analysts able to conduct strategic 
assessments across the whole field of defence, security and foreign policy.23 Study of the 
Soviet Union heightened the need for area and linguistic specialists, in addition to 
economic intelligence analysts, and greater analytic expertise in nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and advanced conventional weaponry. 
 More recently, specialist analysts (including in the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre) conduct analysis into and assessment of international terrorist networks and 
radicalised individuals. The NCA and the Metropolitan Police use national intelligence to 
investigate serious and organised crime, including detecting child abuse, modern slavery 
and people-smuggling networks, and local police forces use the national policing 
intelligence model against ‘volume crimes’.24 New analytic specialisations studying 
intelligence on international financial movements, cryptocurrencies, social security fraud 
and tax evasion have developed.  
 The internet now provides a gateway to an ever-expanding quantity of open-
source data (including from social media platforms) that has become seen by all analysts 
as an important complement to secret sources, but which requires specialist technical 
training to exploit to the full.25 For the future, current developments in data science and 
                                                 
23 See Michael S Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume 1: From 
the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 
2014). 
24 Volume crime ‘is any crime which, through its sheer volume, has a significant impact on the community and 
the ability of the local police force to tackle it.’ See National Police Improvement Agency, Practice Advice on 
The Management of Priority and Volume Crime (The Volume Crime Management Model), Second Edition, 2009, 
p.8. 
25 For a concise statement of the problem of integrating open source data in intelligence analysis, see Stephen 
C. Mercado, ‘Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age: A Venerable Source in a New Era,’ Studies in 
Intelligence, Vol.48(3), Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 2004. 
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various forms of AI, including Bayesian programme learning and causal neural networks, 
seem set to become part of the working toolset of many analysts. There is so much 
information that it requires specially trained analysts applying advanced algorithms to 
separate the signals from the noise, to discern the insights from the hindsight.26 The 
future is no longer merely about ensuring the capture of adequate quantities of data but 
– more particularly – the challenge of processing, storing and analysing these vast 
quantities of data.27  
 From this three conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the increasing 
specialisation in intelligence assessment is a historical trend that will continue to develop 
and deepen.28 This threatens to undermine current efforts within the civil service to draw 
together a single profession of all-source intelligence analysts.29 This needs to be 
consciously managed by ensuring that analysts of different specialisations and from 
different organisations have ways of professionally meeting, to be aware of the 
developments in each other’s areas and to co-produce new techniques and cross-
pollinate between disciplines. This can be described as ‘social learning’ and has been 
proven to provide strong added value to those engaged in international military 
                                                 
26 IBM Marketing Cloud, ‘10 Key Marketing Trends for 2017 and Ideas for Exceeding Customer 
Expectations’, https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=WRL12345USEN, 
accessed 19 November 2018. 
27 Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: The Art and Science of Prediction (London: Penguin, 2013). 
28 For background, see Julian Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
29 Although many UKIC officials are crown servants rather than civil servants, where they and other 
non-civil servants in the wider public sector occupy intelligence analysis roles it would be sensible for 
them to be brought into the closest possible alignment with the civil service profession of intelligence 
analysis. 
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education, and also to have the tangential benefit of reducing transnational 
misunderstandings about developments in the field.30  
The second conclusion is that digital technology (and its legal and oversight 
environment) will exert an even greater impact in future on analysts than it has already, 
and there is therefore a need to ensure that those on the cutting edge outside the civil 
service, in private industry or academia, are able to communicate developments across 
the secure boundaries of the profession.  
The third conclusion returns to Robert Cecil: today’s policymakers cannot now 
hope to emulate his one-man approach and undertake their own intelligence 
assessments. There is simply too much information, regarding too many targets, derived 
from such a delicate skein of sources and methods that its proper interpretation and 
assessment must itself be a specialised task.  
 
[H1]Professionalising Intelligence Assessment  
The first efforts to ‘professionalise’ intelligence assessment in the UK took place in 1968 
at a time when the analytical component of Britain’s intelligence community was going 
through major reorganisation. The desire to improve professionalisation was not 
restricted to the sphere of intelligence: 1968 also saw the Fulton Report31 criticise the cult 
of the amateur or generalist within the wider civil service. Part of the stimulus then was 
the changing world and Britain’s future role. Regarding intelligence assessment, partly it 
was also to do with improving the quality of the analytic product, particularly at a time 
                                                 
30 See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (London: Prentice Hall, 1977). See also Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping 
with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’ Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol.37, No.1, 2014), 
pp.30-64. 
31 Fulton Committee, The Report of the Committee on the Civil Service (Cmnd. 3638), 1968. 
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when it was perceived that collection efforts would become increasingly hampered. The 
point, according to one of the architects of this reform, was to ‘introduce a greater 
degree of objective “professionalism” into our handling of intelligence’.32 Part of the 
answer was to create the Assessments Staff within the Cabinet Office JIC structure. Not 
only was this a question of appointing the right people to staff it, but of engaging 
broadly across government and outside it: 
 
The requirement was for literate, relevant and up-to-date studies of trends of longer-
term significance which would command the attention of those responsible for the 
formulation of policy. These should be produced by drawing fully upon the sources of 
Whitehall Departments and, where necessary, on those of the outside world. The staff 
should be regarded as a species of dynamo producing long-term papers with substantial 
impact. The task and scope were considerable: while the staff need not be large and 
should avoid being top heavy, it would need to be composed of first-class men who 
were skilled drafters and active at seeking the necessary information.33 
 
Questions of gender aside, this quotation reveals one of the longest running 
questions that underpin the professionalisation of analysts: can a well-educated, 
intelligent person be trained to become a great analyst (and more fundamentally, can 
agreement ever be reached on what defines a great analyst?), or are there special 
                                                 
32 John W Young, ‘The Wilson Government’s Reform of Intelligence Coordination, 1967-68’, 
Intelligence and National Security (Vol. 16, No. 2, 2001), pp. 133–51. 
33 See MISC 155(67), 1st Meeting, ‘Intelligence: Interdepartmental Committee Structure’, 29 June 
1967.  The National Archives (Kew): CAB 163/124.  There will be more detail on these changes and 
the background to them in the second volume of Michael S Goodman, The Official History of the 
Joint Intelligence Committee (forthcoming). 
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characteristics that need to be talent spotted at the recruitment stage? Certainly, those 
who have written about training analysts cannot agree on an answer, but many 
international agencies seek to sift trainees for temperament and early technical skill to 
try and improve the chances of moulding successful analysts.34   
 The 1968 creation of the Assessments Staff was certainly successful: it remains in 
existence today and has changed remarkably little in concept despite repeated 
examination of the Australian Office of National Assessments (ONA) model based on 
transfer into the Cabinet Office (and into the Single Intelligence Account) of all-source 
analysts from Defence Intelligence.  
 The idea of professionalising analysts returned with the findings of Lord Butler’s 
2004 ‘Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction’35 that identified the need 
for systematic ‘challenge’ to intelligence assessments of threats and opportunities and 
engagement with the wider community of relevant outside experts, a call repeated by 
the Chilcot Report in terms of policy analysis as well as intelligence assessments.36  
It is arguable whether that need has yet been met across the civil service in terms 
of the prevailing culture. While there will always be some barriers, for example an 
analyst’s time to engage, the requirement to vet and clear those outside the community, 
and the need for information security, the intelligence assessment community has made 
                                                 
34 For a European approach see José-Miguel Palacios, ‘Intelligence Analysis Training: A European 
Perspective’, International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs (Vol. 18, No. 1, 
2016), pp. 34–56. 
35 Robin Butler, ‘Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, HC898, 14 July 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf, accessed 19 November 2018. 
36 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (HC 264), 6 July 2016, 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-
report/, accessed 19 November 2018. It is perhaps worth noting that the chairman of the Iraq Inquiry, 
Sir John Chilcot, was previously a member of Lord Butler’s 2004 inquiry. 
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great strides in the past few years. There is now a regular diet of external engagement 
across the intelligence assessment community, with analysts keen to ensure they have a 
broad understanding of an issue and that they are being regularly challenged – not least 
to ensure they are not victims of ‘groupthink’ – a point made recently by Alex Younger, 
the Chief of SIS, about the need to ‘stimulate a contrary view’.37   
  One post-Butler construction, adopted in 2005, is the Cabinet Office post of 
Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment (PHIA). The first incumbent, Jane Knight, 
was a civilian appointed at the level of a 2* and was responsible for promoting the idea 
of greater professionalisation in assessment and to engender a sense of profession. A 
small team was established under the PHIA with a remit including providing advice and 
supervision of cross-community analytical capacity and capabilities, methodology and 
training. One significant achievement has been the addition of intelligence analyst to the 
list of civil service professions and the emerging development of degree apprenticeships 
to support the profession.38  The effect of this has been to strengthen training and 
engagement across the intelligence community.  
The concept of an analytic profession was nevertheless a big change for the 
intelligence community, with the traditionally siloed approach to the pursuit of a career 
within one department meaning that there has been less ventilation from career moves 
between agencies than there might otherwise have been, and with the agencies tending 
                                                 
37 Cited in Ewen MacAskill, ‘Hostile states pose 'fundamental threat' to Europe, says MI6 chief’, The 
Guardian (8 December 2016).  Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/dec/08/hostile-states-pose-fundamental-threat-to-europe-says-mi6-chief, accessed 19 
November 2018.  
38 On these more broadly see UK Government, ‘Working for the Civil Service’,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service/about/recruitment#professions, accessed 
8 July 2018. 
 14 
 
to see their intelligence officers as cycling through operational, analytic and 
administrative functions as part of a full career rather than being recruited as career 
analysts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was also initially difficult to see many tangible results 
from being called a profession – and some critics feared a loss of momentum following 
Knight’s retirement in August 2007, which resulted in a long period during which the 
professionalisation agenda appeared to lack a senior champion.  
It is inherent in any bureaucratic structure that in the absence of vigorous and 
enlightened central leadership, agencies and departments will tend to go their own way. 
Even with vigorous central leadership, agencies often need to be convinced of the value 
of central coordination and standardisation. At the centre, there is a need for recognition 
that, despite advances in joint working within the UKIC, it can be difficult for the 
representatives of individual agencies and departments to adopt the perspective of the 
whole profession when they are faced with the responsibility to preserve the equities of 
a specific institution.    
And there is no shortage of institutional equities: the scope of those that might in 
the light of the NSS be regarded as part of the intelligence analysis profession has 
significantly widened in recent years, given the use of secret intelligence by departments 
such as the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) and the Department for International Development (DFID), together with a 
range of border and law enforcement bodies including the NCA and SO15 (Counter 
Terrorism Command), in addition to departments such as the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), HM Treasury (HMT) and the Home Office, which are 
traditionally represented on the JIC. This proliferation of institutional stakeholders 
highlights the requirement for effective central coordination, to shepherd the definition 
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and development of the intelligence assessment profession and to take responsibility for 
its health.    
 In the 2018 NSCR, there are two brief mentions of a virtual National Security 
Academy (vNSA).39 The review noted that the vNSA was ‘[i]n progress or ongoing’40 and 
that its primary focus would be training on the Fusion Doctrine. These brief references 
owe their origin to the 2015 NSS/SDSR: 
 
Our ability to implement and deliver our vision is underpinned by the knowledge 
and skills of our people. We intend to take a more strategic shared approach 
across government, including by ensuring our education and training 
establishments work more closely together. These include the Diplomatic 
Academy, the Defence Academy, the Emergency Planning College and the 
College of Policing. We will establish a virtual National Security Academy which 
will act as a hub for these organisations to share, develop and maintain critical 
knowledge and skills across the national security community, leading to greater 
coherence and common professional standards.41 
 
Potentially of great importance to the intelligence analytic profession, the vNSA 
has frankly made slow progress. Be that as it may, this was neither what the original 
concept had in mind nor the requirements in central government called for, including 
doing more to recognise that academia, in particular, has something to offer the 
intelligence community. Whilst the UKIC and DI have reached out to small segments of 
                                                 
39 UK Government, National Security Capability Review, pp. 11 and 51. 
40 Ibid., p. 49. 
41 UK Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 
84. Emphasis in original. 
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higher education for research and education over time, and the FCO has created a 
Knowledge Exchange Fellowship Scheme to bring academic expertise into the 
department, there is an absence of coordination or standards-setting to these efforts. 
This has been replicated in law enforcement intelligence, which is increasingly playing a 
role in national security, via counterterrorism, countering the logistic lines of terrorism 
and other forms of organised criminality and subversion.42 These efforts to 
professionalise law enforcement intelligence have seen the development of a Level 4 
(first-year undergraduate level) apprenticeship in Intelligence Operations, which aims to 
be an introductory course for all the law enforcement and related non-core intelligence 
agencies – and indeed has since been adopted by the British Army and Royal Air Force for 
their respective junior analysts.43 Because of its level, however, it can only be viewed in 
lowest-common-denominator terms, the same being the case for the Police Constables 
apprenticeship, which contains intelligence components, but in relatively small 
quantities.44  
For high-end law enforcement intelligence units, the challenge is to find forms of 
education and training that match up to the standards of the UKIC and also of 
international partners who – in the Anglosphere – typically expect education and training 
to postgraduate level. The Government Intelligence Analyst Training (GIAT) course sees 
analysts complete modules to work towards a City and Guilds qualification in Intelligence 
                                                 
42 See, for example, HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (Cm 
9608), June 2018, and the National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised 
Crime 2018, 13 May 2018. 
43 For more information, see Find Apprenticeship Training, ‘Intelligence Operations’, 
https://findapprenticeshiptraining.sfa.bis.gov.uk/Apprenticeship/Framework/637-20-1, accessed 6 
August 2018. 
44 For more information, see College of Policing, ‘Policing Education Qualifications Framework 
(PEQF)’, http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Learning/Policing-Education-Qualifications-
Framework/Pages/Policing-Education-Qualifications-Framework.aspx, accessed 6 August 2018.  
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Analysis. The GIAT and its sister course in DI (currently known as the Defence Intelligence 
Analyst Module or DIAM) are run nearly 30 times per year, demonstrating a clear demand 
for training, but it remains true that the absence of agreed or centralised standards for 
intelligence education – in PHIA, the College of Policing, the Ministry of Defence, Home 
Office or FCO – is a significant shortcoming and vulnerability for the Fusion Doctrine. In 
the authors’ view, this should be a priority for PHIA in the run up to the next government 
spending review.  
Similarly, as military educators discovered well over a decade ago, there is a 
sensitive balance between training (in terms of development of skills) and education (in 
terms of development of an individual’s knowledge base and critical reasoning abilities). 
Sophisticated actors, depended upon to show good judgement, require both skills and 
knowledge: it is a requirement that transcends traditional professional development and 
university programmes, and requires employers to take risks concerning non-measurable 
benefits and creating longer spaces between classes to ensure that learning outcomes 
are not undermined by trying to cram too much into one programme (the benefits of so-
called ‘soak time’), but it is one that the apprenticeships’ initiatives are driving towards.  
 
[h1]Developments Overseas 
The UK does not, of course, confront the challenge of improving analytical training and 
education in a vacuum or from a standing start. There are, for example, opportunities for 
the UKIC to build on existing efforts to benefit from expertise in the UK-based 
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commercial sector and academia.45 Increasing professionalisation of intelligence 
assessment is, therefore, not only consistent with the direction of travel of the British 
past, but also an opportunity to learn from and build on the experience of other sectors – 
as well as from developments in several other national intelligence communities. 
Given the close links between the UK and US intelligence communities through 
the UKUSA Agreement (also known as the Five Eyes),46 it is worth starting any 
comparison of national cases with consideration of the US example, which provides an 
interesting counterpoint to contemporaneous developments in the UK. 
Debates about the analytical profession and how to improve it have a 
distinguished pedigree in the US, for example in the writings of Sherman Kent and Roger 
Hilsman in the mid-20th century, and in more recent decades Jack Davis, Richards J Heuer, 
Jr., Gregory F Treverton, and several others.47 The vibrancy of the US literature – much of 
it written by intelligence practitioners or former practitioners – is mirrored in the variety 
                                                 
45 In addition to the private sector, examples of UK universities with relevant expertise and existing 
programmes of teaching include: Brunel, Buckingham, King’s College London, Leicester and 
University College London. 
46 The UKUSA agreement dates to March 1946, and was originally known as the Britain-United 
States (BRUSA) Agreement. See Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Not so secret: deal at the heart of UK-US 
intelligence,’ Guardian (25 June 2010). Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/25/intelligence-deal-uk-us-released, accessed 19 
November 2018. 
47 See, for example, Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1949); Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions 
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956); Jack Davis, The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis: An Intelligence 
Monograph (CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1992); Richards J. Heuer, Jr. The Psychology 
of Intelligence Analysis (Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999); and 
Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (RAND: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
For a collection of essays, including contributions by Jack Davis and Richards Heuer, see Roger Z 
George and James B Bruce (eds), Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008). See also Stephen Marrin, Improving 
Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice (London: Routledge, 
2011). 
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of provision of intelligence training and education, for example in the university sector, 
as well as in reforms of analytic practice within the US intelligence community (USIC). For 
example, the National Intelligence University is a federally chartered university under the 
Director of National Intelligence. It continues to provide undergraduate and graduate 
study in subjects central to the profession of intelligence and national security.48 
Research fellowships prepare personnel for senior positions in the USIC, including the 
ability to research topics at Top Secret/Special Compartmented Intelligence levels. 
The current state of analytic training and education in the US is the result of 
several decades of reform and response to external events. From the mid- to late 1990s, 
there has been increasing recognition within the US government of the need to improve 
USIC analytic practices, training and career pathways, as well as the need for that 
community to become more open to learning from outsiders’ expertise, for example in 
academia and business.49 
Perhaps inevitably, and in a way that closely mirrors the UK’s experience of 
intelligence reforms following the Falkland Islands Review (better known as the Franks 
Report)50 and its post-Iraq War equivalent, the Butler Report, part of the impetus for this 
period of US reform came from reports commissioned in the wake of perceived 
analytical failures. For example, one consequence of India’s nuclear tests in 1998 was an 
independent review, urgently commissioned by then CIA director George J Tenet and led 
by a retired Admiral and former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David E 
                                                 
48 See http://ni-u.edu/wp/academics/degrees/, accessed 19 November 2018. 
49 See, for example, Gregory F Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
50 The Franks Committee, Falkland Islands Review: A Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, 
January 1983. 
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Jeremiah, into the intelligence failures that contributed to US policymakers’ surprise at 
the Indian tests.51 
In addition to recommendations about improving the management and 
organisation of the wider USIC,53 the Jeremiah review recommended better coordination 
and integration of analytical expertise contained in different agencies and departments, 
as well as improvements in analytical training: it also recommended that the intelligence 
community should bring in both ‘outside substantive experts in a more systematic 
fashion’ and particularly so when the community ‘faces a transition on a major 
intelligence issue.’ These supplementary analysts ‘would serve, together with 
substantive specialists, as “Red Teams” on major analytic problems and work with 
analysts to study assumptions, mirror-imaging, and complex analytic processes.’.54 
The Jeremiah Report’s recommendations therefore underline the potential value 
to the intelligence community of increased openness to non-governmental expertise, not 
least as a means of keeping governmental analysis up-to-date and inoculated against 
overly entrenched in-house consensus or mindset biases.55 The approaches and 
structures introduced in this period, such as the CIA’s Sherman Kent School for 
Intelligence Analysis, and its senior analytical service (providing a progressive career 
                                                 
51 Whilst the full text of the Jeremiah Report remains classified, a summary of its recommendations has been 
declassified by the CIA. See Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Recommendations of the Jeremiah Report,’ June 
1998. Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB187/IN38.pdf, accessed 19 November 2018. 
53 Walter Pincus, ‘Spy Agencies Faulted for Missing Indian Tests,’ Washington Post, 3 June 1998. 
54 See Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Recommendations of the Jeremiah Report,’ June 1998. Available at: 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB187/IN38.pdf, accessed 19 November 2018. 
55 See Richard A Best, Jr., ‘U.S. Intelligence and India’s Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned’, 
Congressional Research Service, 11 August 1998. 
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pathway for analysts), soon received another spur for reform after the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11.56 
Over this period, the USIC encountered several of the same drivers for reform as 
those faced by the UK, but as compared with the intensity, plurality and sheer scale of 
the USIC response, the post-Butler experience of the PHIA initiative and other 
departmental advances in professional training represent a more modest, incremental 
step towards wider analytic reform. In light of the US comparison, it is perhaps natural to 
wonder whether the UK could benefit from emulating the scale of the USIC’s ambition, 
as well as its commendable openness to alternative approaches and its similar 
commitment to greater transparency, both of which were, for example, evident in its 
funding and publishing of Rob Johnston’s insightful ethnographic research into the US 
analytic community in the early 2000s.57 
 Turning briefly to several other national intelligence communities and what the 
UK can learn from the diversity of comparative cases, the German Federal Ministry of 
Defence, in collaboration with the Federal Intelligence Service, will launch in 2019 a new 
MA/MSc degree programme in Intelligence and Security Studies, in conjunction with the 
Federal University of Public Administration and the Bundeswehr University in Munich.58  
It is a two-year, full-time, multi-disciplinary programme with content ranging from law, 
psychology, political science, history and sociology, to informatics, economics, culture 
and media studies. Of its various aims, the first is the ‘professionalisation of intelligence 
                                                 
56 This period of analytical reform in the US intelligence community is well summarised in Marrin, 
Improving Intelligence Analysis, pp.77–99. 
57 Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005). 
58 See https://www.unibw.de/ciss/miss/miss_en, accessed 19 November 2018. 
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education’ and, although it is predominantly a defence and military enterprise, the 
longer-term aim is for this initiative to enhance professionalisation across the wider 
federal intelligence community. To support this, the relevant authorities are in the 
process of recruiting outside academics, to whom it can issue appropriate security 
clearances to teach on the course.59 
In France, a similar approach has recently been approved. Whilst there has been 
an intelligence academy (L’Academie de Renseignement) since 2010, it is shortly to start 
offering undergraduate and postgraduate degrees to intelligence community personnel.  
As its director, François Chambon, recently commented, ‘not only do agents need to 
know about subjects like law, political science and history, they also need to be familiar 
with cognitive sciences like anthropology and social sciences’. 60 More broadly the French 
intelligence community is extending its links to academia, unheard of 10 years ago. 
In Norway, similar moves have already taken place, with an undergraduate degree 
offered since 2013 to those working in the intelligence community writ large (both 
producers and consumers). This complements a longer-standing postgraduate 
programme, although the newer course offers an actual degree rather than the 
opportunity to attend courses. The undergraduate course is split into four modules 
taught by outsiders, with a heavy emphasis on history and political sciences, and 
complemented by a number of modules run by Norwegian intelligence officials.62 
                                                 
59 Marc Felix Serrao, ‘Die neue Schule der Spione’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18 November 2017. 
60 Adam Sage, ‘French Secret Services to be Offered Degree in Spying’, The Times, 21 June 2018. 
62 Huw Dylan et al., ‘The Way of the Norse Ravens: Merging Profession and Academe in Norwegian 
National Intelligence Higher Education’, Intelligence and National Security (Vol. 32, No. 7, 2017), 
pp. 944–60. 
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The value of academia to the intelligence community therefore transcends 
subject-matter expertise. Borne out of the Butler Report’s recommendations that 
government analysts needed further training, specialisation and a career structure,63 in 
2006 King’s College London collaborated with the Cabinet Office to create the King’s 
Intelligence Studies Programme.64 This was and is an innovative course, designed to 
bring together analysts from across the British intelligence community (and now law 
enforcement) to learn about issues relevant to their community and to be introduced to 
scholarship in intelligence studies. In the 12 years since it was created, well over 600 
people from across the breadth and depth of government have passed the course. Today 
those completing it gain MA credits, which can be used towards any degree within the 
Erasmus scheme.65 With this background in merging academia and intelligence, it is no 
surprise that the European intelligence communities and countries referred to above 
have borrowed heavily (both in terms of personnel and content) from previous UK 
experience.  
 
[h1]Conclusions  
Governments have long benefited from intelligence communities to help them avoid 
unwelcome surprises and to make better decisions. The task of intelligence is to tell it as 
it is and reduce the ignorance of the decision-maker: to find out what is happening, to 
                                                 
63 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004, p.145. 
64 For more about the course, its content, background and rationale, see Michael S Goodman and 
David Omand, ‘What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program’, 
Studies in Intelligence (Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008), pp. 39–50. 
65 See European Funding Guide, ‘Erasmus – Having Your Credits Recognised’, http://www.european-
funding-guide.eu/articles/financing-tips/erasmus-having-your-credits-recognised, accessed 8 July 
2018. 
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explain why that is, and to forecast (as well as they are able in conditions of uncertainty) 
how things might develop in the future.66 Over the years, specialised and structured 
techniques for finding out about the world of adversaries have been developed by 
intelligence analysts. These techniques are applied daily to help distinguish the important 
from the merely urgent, the significant from the eye-catching, and the true from the false 
and deceptive.67  
Today, given the data deluge from the internet and social media, such disciplined 
ways of thinking and structured analytic techniques become ever-more important to 
customers ranging from members of the National Security Council and their policy staffs 
to military and police commanders. The need for strong links with developments outside 
the secret world is apparent in such areas as cognitive and behavioural studies, social 
psychology, data science and AI, political science, international law and cyber norms, and 
not least regional and country studies. Modern assessment helps to transform the 
decision-maker’s ignorance about an uncertain future, providing assessments that are 
more easily intelligible for those officials tasked with making decisions about how to 
manage and mitigate national security threats.68   
There are already several different initiatives within the British intelligence 
community to improve analytical tradecraft in the face of changing demands for analytic 
products and the pressures of managing the diverse threats identified in the NSS. The 
                                                 
66 See Kristian Gustafson, ‘Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence 
Community,’ Intelligence and National Security (Vol. 25, No. 5, 2010), pp. 589–610. 
67 For a more critical perspective on the value of structured analytical techniques, see Welton Chang 
et al., ‘Restructuring Structured Analytic Techniques in Intelligence,’ Intelligence and National 
Security (Vol. 33, No. 3, 2018), pp. 337–56. 
68 Erik J Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014). 
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momentum behind these initiatives is spreading too, and other parts of the government, 
including the law enforcement community, are also trying to keep apace and introduce 
more effective and concerted analytical training. 
The problem the authors identify is that there is presently insufficient consistency 
between these disparate efforts. There is effectively no quality control or a centrally 
coordinated process of benchmarking and diffusion of best practice. Efforts are currently 
scattered and the sources of outside accreditation and standards are dispersed between 
different organisations, even though the professions are increasingly linked. Put simply, 
there is as yet no coherent strategic view regarding the future of the profession 
(nationally or transnationally). Without this integral strategic foundation for their 
profession, it is harder than it should be for the analysts of today and tomorrow to share 
experiences across departmental lines or with close allies and partners. A more joined-up 
approach to professionalising intelligence assessment would not only represent value for 
money, but it would also create a more robust platform for future progress.  
There are other reasons to consider a break with the traditional departmental 
approach to training new analysts. First, the success of this approach often depends on 
the continuing availability within particular departments of a cadre of appropriately 
experienced and sufficiently trained mentors, and a sustainable ratio between each 
department’s new recruits and its more experienced analysts and small groups of full-
time training staff. This approach is therefore vulnerable to demographic changes in the 
analytical profession: it would be placed under strain were a particular department to 
experience either a precipitous reduction in the number of experienced analysts, and/or 
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a significant spike in the number of new entrant analysts.69 Departmental primacy leaves 
analytic training subject to competing departmental priorities, for example if a 
department needs to reallocate a finite training budget to cope with a surge in new 
entrant case officers or investigators.  
A further shortcoming in the traditional, uncoordinated and stove-piped 
departmental approach is in fact the reverse side of its greatest strength: in this system, 
new entrants benefit from the received wisdom of experienced practitioners, but the 
transfer of knowledge from current to new practitioners within one departmental silo 
risks the perpetuation of ‘groupthink’, entrenchment of outmoded methods, and a 
missed opportunity to build on the current professionalisation agenda to create a truly 
cross-governmental cohort of analysts for whom agile deployment between agencies 
and departments becomes the norm over the course of their careers.  
A sharper sense of professional identity, greater agility and resilience, future-
proofing and openness to new learning and techniques would all flow from the adoption 
of a genuinely cross-governmental approach to the training and education of UK 
intelligence analysts. Such a move would be a prudent step for the community as a 
whole, not simply because it aligns with the implicit rationale of the Fusion Doctrine, but 
because it enables the pre-emptive development of a shared central resource, before the 
community begins to experience any problems associated with ‘grey-green’ 
demographic shifts, reliance on dated methodologies, or (most sobering of all) the 
                                                 
69 This is similar to the problem identified in the USIC during the mid-2000s of the problems 
associated with a demographic imbalance between numbers of older and younger analysts (a ‘grey-
green’ age distribution), and the likely adverse impact of this imbalance on existing models of 
analytic training. See Gregory F Treverton ‘Foreword’, in Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US 
Intelligence Community, p. xii. 
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sudden need to demonstrate to politicians and the public its commitment to analytical 
training and career development following some future crisis of perceived intelligence 
failure, and the inquiry that would surely follow. 
What might this alternative future look like? In one scenario, a cohort of 20 new 
analysts join the Junior Analyst Course at the Queen Elizabeth II School of Intelligence 
Assessment twice per year, before going on to their respective units; in addition, 15 more 
senior analysts will take part in a month-long managerial course to prepare themselves 
for becoming head of an analytical team. Elsewhere on the campus, an international 
cadre primarily made up of European allies will be participating in a six-week scenario-
planning exercise on the future of terrorism.  
If the UK is to successfully execute its existing and future national security 
strategies, its executive actors and decision-makers must be well informed and apprised 
of unpredictable, high-impact developments: the existence of a flourishing professional 
intelligence assessment community, making sense of the world to support key decisions, 
is surely an indispensable step in this direction.   
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